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Abstract
This article investigates the role played by informational cost in agricultural land markets
to explain price dispersion. Based on a hedonic model under incomplete information,
we build a two-tier stochastic frontier. By linking costs of being information deficient to
agent characteristics such as degree of professionalism, we identify relative price effects
of buyers and sellers related to search. We compile a comprehensive data set of more than
10,000 transactions in Saxony-Anhalt, Germany, between 2014 and 2017. We find insti-
tutional sellers to achieve the lowest losses resulting from information deficiency while
tenant buyers can benefit from informational advantages. We conclude that Germany’s
policy-makers can do more to support market transparency.
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Price dispersion has been traced back to heterogeneous buyer and seller groups in markets
for homogeneous goods (cf. Kaplan et al. (2019) and cited literature therein). Farmland
is a heterogeneous and unique good with a limited overall supply. Given its immobility,
however, suitable substitutes are often lacking, most farmland markets are narrow with a
high specificity of each transaction (cf. Borchers, Ifft, and Kuethe 2014), and even though
capital may be mobile, market entry remains low despite increasing demand by investors.
Trading volumes range between one and two percent in many regions of the Global North
(Ciaian, Kancs, and Swinnen 2010; Bigelow, Borchers, and Hubbs 2016). Thus, farmland
markets share characteristics of thin markets (Kuethe and Bigelow 2018).
Thin farmland markets present several problems. A seller’s maximum willingness to
pay may exceed a buyer’s minimum willingness to accept. Expectations of surpluses over
which they can bargain (Harding, Knight, and Sirmans 2003) may emerge. Search for
the respective seller (buyer) with lowest (highest) willingness to accept (pay) is costly,
as is finding substitutes. Gathering the information needed to establish an agricultural
property’s true market value may be expensive and time-consuming for the seller and buyer;
depending on the respective search process and bargaining position, one or the other may
influence the price (King and Sinden 1994). Hence, in addition to characteristics relevant
for productivity1, the information gathering proficiency and bargaining power of both seller
and buyer matter (Polachek and Yoon 1987). Resulting agent-specific prices may neither
send appropriate market information nor help in efficient price discovery.
Agent-specific prices have been traced to the different expectations held by new owners
concerning a property’s potential future returns (e.g., Brorsen, Doye, and Neal 2015). Price
variations have also been explained by regional peculiarities, for instance, expectations of
future land development in urban proximity (e.g., Plantinga and Miller 2001; Kolbe et al.
2015), zoning regulations in peri-urban markets (e.g., Eagle et al. 2014; Turner, Haugh-
wout, and van der Klaaur 2014), the variety of agricultural policies (e.g., Graubner 2018),
1We refer to Nickerson and Zhang (2014) for an excellent overview on farmland price determinants.
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the agglomeration effects of subsidized renewable energy production (e.g., Hennig and
Latacz-Lohmann 2016; Towe and Tra 2013), and the local or regional market regulations
(e.g., Lawley 2018).
The majority of farmland price studies have implicitly acknowledged remaining price
variation by means of spatio-temporal effects (e.g., Maddison 2009), but that are hardly
generalizable. Few studies have explored agent-specific prices due to thinness, such
as price-sensitivity to farmer-buyer characteristics (e.g., Kuethe and Bigelow 2018) or
price-effects due to the competition among potential farmer buyers (Margarian 2010).
To our knowledge, only Cotteleer, Gardebroek, and Luijt (2008) have acknowledged
agent-specific prices due to bargaining and market power. Typically framed within a
hedonic pricing framework, these studies focus on average effects and do not consider the
search process and the role of asymmetrically distributed information costs. One study
has argued that such asymmetries produce different different bargaining positions with
respective price-sensitivity (Curtiss et al. 2013). The results by these authors, however,
lack external validity since estimation procedures have not been adjusted to acknowledge
these asymmetries. Polachek and Yoon (1987) were the first to suggest a two-tier model
which separates the observed prices into a hedonic part and three error components (noise,
and seller- and buyer-specific price impacts) to account for the relative levels of agents’
search and information costs. While studies of the real estate market have highlighted
the role of asymmetric information in price schedules (Kumbhakar and Parmeter 2010),
we have not found similar studies of farmland markets. Therefore, in this article we
empirically investigate the role of the search process in farmland price formation.
We assume that the search process and respective additional cost can be related to a
seller’s degree of professionalism, for instance, a licensed real estate agent who often relies
on auctions without bargaining, versus a private seller who primarily relies on negotiating,
to understand the relative price relevance of the search process with potential losses for the
less professional seller. On the buyer side, we link the categories of (non-)farmer and (non-
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tenant) farmer to asymmetries in the search process to identify the respective price effects
of both parties. To differentiate seller- and buyer-specific effects, we construct a two-tier
model of farmland prices within a hedonic price function with two additional one-sided
error terms following Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2010). We specify the terms as functions
of the observed characteristics of buyers and sellers using the scaling property (Parmeter
2018).
To validate the estimation approach, we compare our two-tier model based on the theory
of thin markets to a reduced form of the model, where seller and buyer characteristics lin-
early add to the price function. We use a data set of more than 10,000 transactions for arable
land from 2014 and 2017 in, Saxony-Anhalt, a heavily agricultural state in Germany. Its
history of economic transition with a professional privatization agency makes the state an
ideal setting for comparing different degrees of professionalism and searches on the seller
side. We expect that modeling the hedonic price function within a stochastic frontier frame-
work combined with spatial and temporal effects will help to mitigate the omitted variable
biases that typically result from the data limitations in such models (Carriazo, Ready, and
Shortle 2013). We find institutional sellers relying on public tenders to achieve the lowest
losses resulting from information deficiency with markups. Farmer-tenant buyers benefit
from informational advantages resulting in markdowns, with the exception of very small
and very large transactions.
We believe that existing studies have largely underestimated the role of informational
asymmetries by neglecting the explicit price-impact of buyers and sellers. Therefore, this
article makes the following contributions. To our knowledge, it is the first to construct a
two-tier model with a scaling property free of distributional assumptions about the error
terms, and apply it to the agricultural sector.2 Second, the model emphasizes the impor-
tance of making adjustments when analyzing prices in thin markets. Third, we hope it
2We refer to Bonanno et al. (2019) who applied a one-tier model to price the credence attributes of food
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will inform the development of policy measures that support transparency and efficiency in
farmland markets.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the theoretical
and econometric framework used. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy, the data, and
the hypotheses. Section 4 applies the two-tier and simplified models to a comprehensive
data set of agricultural transactions and discusses the results. Section 5 discusses the policy
implications and gives suggestions for future research.
Theoretical model and estimation
A hedonic pricing model with incomplete information
We employ a search model with bargaining to identify the effects of asymmetric informa-
tion on farmland prices. We assume that buyers and sellers enter the market with a set of
beliefs about the distribution of prices, given the heterogeneity of the land. While agents
may have different sets of information, they can invest in searches to improve their bargain-
ing positions, for instance, by identifying competing offers from other sellers or buyers. We
assume that all agents search optimally and that each buyer faces a trade-off between the
search costs and finding a seller with a lower willingness to accept (WTA). Likewise, each
seller faces a trade-off between the search costs and finding a buyer with the highest will-
ingness to pay (WTP). Both search and informational costs may vary across agents, for
instance, when local and non-local prospective buyers have different access to information,
the cost variations are particularly relevant for substitutes. Similarly, an experienced pro-
fessional seller may have lower search costs than a private seller with no experience. For
instance, the professional seller may rely on tendering procedures that ease search finding
the buyer with the highest WTP while the inexperienced private seller may rely on nego-
tiations. In other words, when agents with higher search costs stop gathering information
sooner, the buyers (sellers) with high search costs experience higher (lower) prices.
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To model the search process under informational asymmetries, we use a hedonic pric-
ing model following Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2010). We use the two-tier framework of
Polachek and Yoon (1987) to incorporate information and search. Thus, the two additional
one-sided error terms acknowledge the price impact of the buyer and seller characteristics
related to search and informational cost.
According to the standard hedonic pricing model of Rosen (1974) under full information
and thick markets, the hedonic price of farmland Ph is formulated as
(1) Ph = h(x)+ v;
where x denotes a vector of lot characteristics (e.g., lot size and soil quality), h(:) is the
hedonic price function, and v collects measurement errors and noise. In this model, price
variation is only caused by heterogeneity and potential information asymmetries are disre-
garded.
To expand this model to our setting, we adopt a two-tier frontier model and apply it to
buyers and sellers separately. The maximum WTP among buyers defines an upper bound
of the market price, and the lowest WTA among sellers defines the lower bound. The price
a seller receives, Psm, can be written as
(2) Psm = Pb u;
where Pb refers to the highest WTP by a potential buyer in the market and u;u 0 denotes a
seller’s loss from information deficiency, that is, the loss caused by the inability to identify
the buyer with the highest WTP. Likewise, the price a buyer pays, Pbm, can be written as
(3) Pbm = Ps+w;
where Ps is the lowest WTA in the market, and w;w  0 is the markup caused by being
unable to identify the lowest WTA.
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For a transaction to take place, the identical prices for buyer and seller form the market
price Pm such that Pm = Pbm = P
s
m. Using equations (2) and (3) yields Pm = Ps+w = Pb u,
which can further be rearranged such that
(4) Pm+u w = Pb w = Ps+u;
where Ps+u and Pb w are the hedonic prices for sellers and buyers, respectively, adjusted
for their information. Since Ps, Pb, u, and w are unobserved, identification requires further
assumptions. Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2010, p. 10) argue that Pm+u w corresponds to
the price under full information given by the hedonic price Ph. Thus, using equations (4)
and (1), the observed market prices can be expressed as
(5) Pm = h(x)+ v u+w = h(x)+ e:
Equation (5) states that the observed market price of a lot consists of the implied character-
istics of the lot h(x), unobserved noise v, and the costs of information deficiency of sellers
(u) and buyers (w). The composite error term e collects noise and costs of information de-
ficiency. Note that this model collapses to the standard hedonic pricing model if buyers and
sellers have identical information deficiencies (u=w), including the case of fully informed
agents (u = w = 0).
The current setting, however, assumes identical information deficiencies for all buyers
and for all sellers. To allow for potential heterogeneity across agents, we follow Parmeter
(2018) and model information deficiencies as functions of agents’ characteristics. In par-
ticular, a buyer’s information deficiency w is a function of buyer characteristics zw, which
may include knowledge of local market conditions. Likewise, a seller’s cost of information
deficiency is a function of seller characteristics zu, which may include access to distribu-
tion channels. Extending equation (5) delivers the hedonic pricing model with incomplete
information and buyer- and seller-specific costs of information deficiency, the regression
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equation can be formulated as
(6) Pm = h(x)+ v u(zu)+w(zw) = h(x)+ e:
Estimation
To estimate equation (6), we employ the two-tier stochastic frontier model with scaling
property proposed by Parmeter (2018). We define the respective costs of being information
deficient in land transaction i (i = 1; :::;N) as ui = u(zu;i;du) and wi = w(zw;i;dw). The
random variables ui and wi possess the scaling property if ui = u(zu;i;du) = gu(zu;i;du)ui
and wi = w(zw;i;dw) = gw(zw;i;dw)wi , where gu(:)  0, gw(:)  0, and both ui and wi are
independent from z. The functions gu(:) and gw(:) are termed scaling functions, and the
distributions of ui and wi are the basic distributions (cf. Wang and Schmidt 2002).
Imposing the scaling property implies that ui and zi follow common distributions given
by u and w, respectively, which are weighted by observation-specific scales gu(zu;i;du)
and gw(zw;i;dw). Therefore, characteristics zu and zw affect the scale of the functions
u(zu;i;du) and w(zw;i;dw), respectively, but not their shape. Thus, u and w define the
baseline costs of information deficiency. The actual cost of information deficiency, how-
ever, depend on buyer and seller characteristics via the scaling functions gu(:) and gw(:).
To impose the scaling property in our econometric model, we specify the means of the
basic distributions as mu = E[ui ] and mw = E[wi ] (Alvarez et al. 2006). Further, to account
for the non-negativity restrictions from the theoretical model regarding u and w, we use
exponential functions such that gu(zu;i;du) = ez
0
u;idu and gw(zw;i;dw) = ez
0
w;idw . Given the
imposed non-linearity of the deficiency terms, the resulting model can be estimated with
non-linear least squares (NLS) by solving
(7) (bˆ ; dˆu; dˆw; mˆu ; mˆw) = min
(b ;du;dw;mu ;mw)
1
n
N
å
i=1
h
yi h(xi;b )+mu ez
0
u;idu mwez
0
w;idw
i2
:
The minimization delivers the parameters of interest: coefficients b that represent the
implicit values of lot characteristics x, the scale parameters of the costs of information
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deficiency mu and mw, and the impact of buyer and seller characteristics zu and zw captured
by du and dw. Identification of du and dw requires mwe
z0w;idw to be different from mu e
z0u;idu .
Valid inference for the parameter estimates needs to account for heteroscedasticity in the
composite error term; thus, procedures for robust standard errors within NLS frameworks
have to be used (Parmeter 2018). Further, an equivalent model specification can include
the scale parameters into the exponential functions as intercepts to be estimated.
Applying an estimation procedure based on the scaling property has several advantages.
First, although further assumptions on w(zw) and u(zu) are required, no distributional as-
sumptions for the terms are necessary, which allows estimation with NLS. On the con-
trary, efficient estimation with Maximum Likelihood would require correct distributional
assumptions for both inefficiency terms. Second, while standard tools can be used for es-
timation of NLS, there is no closed form solution for the likelihood function of a two-tier
stochastic frontier. Third, contrary to retrieving u and w by deconvolution of a composite
error term based on unobservables as proposed by Kumbhakar and Parmeter (2009, 2010),
the scaling property allows recovering estimates of u and w directly from observables zw
and zu.
In order to validate our results, we contrast the non-linear two-tier model estimated by
NLS to a linear model estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), where the scaling vari-
ables linearly enter the hedonic part of the model. Except for the intercept, OLS parameter
estimates for the hedonic function are unbiased and consistent if the error components are
uncorrelated with the hedonic characteristics, and can thus serve as a benchmark (Parmeter
2018).
Empirical strategy
Our aim is to analyze the role played by informational asymmetries between different buyer
and seller groups in farmland price formation and empirically investigate this question
for the eastern German land market. We begin by describing the farm structure and land
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market in eastern Germany and why we use Saxony-Anhalt’s transaction sales data between
2014 and 2017 to validate our two-tier model. This is followed by the hypotheses and the
empirical model.
Background
The agricultural structure and the farmland market in eastern Germany, where Saxony-
Anhalt is located, have been influenced by expropriation, land collectivization, and socialist
policies. Historically, many large farms were located in Saxony-Anhalt due to the highly
fertile farmland. As they have been primarily subject to expropriation after 1945, the share
of land to be privatized after the German reunification in 1990 was high compared to other
eastern German states. Since its foundation as a successor to the German privatization
agency (Treuhandanstalt) in 1992, BVVG (Bodenverwertungs- und - Verwaltungs GmbH)
privatizes formerly state-owned agricultural and forest land in eastern Germany on behalf
of the Federal Ministry of Finance. Originally, BVVG leased out land under long-term
contracts, but since 2007 it uses public tenders according to German privatization principles
and in line with European law.
Today, the formerly state-owned farms and typical socialistic production cooperatives
operate as cooperatives or corporations, but also single farms have newly or re-established
the business. By 2016, where most recent numbers are available, in eastern (western)
Germany more than 70 (90) percent of farms operate as single farms (BMEL 2018a) and
comprise about 29 percent of the total utilized agricultural area (StaLa 2017). The share of
land operated by legal entities and cooperatives is nearly 50 percent in eastern Germany,
while less than 1 percent in western Germany (BMEL 2018a). In 2016, farms in eastern
Germany were about 223 hectares on average and operated at 67.5 percent rental land
(BMEL 2018b). In the same year, farms in Saxony-Anhalt were 270 hectares on average,
which is the second highest regional average in Germany, and operated at a high land lease
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share of around 72 percent (StaLa 2017). Since 2010, contrary to western Germany, rental
shares have been decreasing since 2010 in eastern Germany (BMEL 2018a).
Against this backdrop, the farmland market of Saxony-Anhalt developed dynamically:
Between 2007 and 2017, mean prices more than tripled from 5,055e=ha to 17,903e=ha.
However, while Saxony-Anhalt had the second highest average prices of Germany’s east-
ern states, the German average was still higher with about 24,064e=ha (Destatis 2018).
To illustrate price dispersion in the land market, we take 2017, the most recent year in our
data set: there were 3,172 farmland transactions of approximately 8,400 hectares in total;
less than one percent of the total agricultural area was transacted with an average plot size
of about 2.68 hectares. The trading volume already varies across Saxony-Anhalt (cf. right
part of figure 1): local transactions range from less than 10 transactions for half of the
municipalities to more than 50 in five municipalities. The median prices per soil quality
index point3 as shown in the left part of figure 1 reveal considerable variation across the
state but without obvious spatial patterns. Against this backdrop, the need for a quantita-
tive assessment of seller and buyer-specific prices to explain this price dispersion seems
obvious.
Data
Our data set consists of 12,134 land market transactions for arable land in Saxony-Anhalt
between 2014 and 2017 taken from the Committee of Land Valuation Experts (Gutachter-
ausschuss für Grundstückswerte in Sachsen-Anhalt, LVermGeo 2018a). Transaction de-
tails include contract date and price, lot characteristics (location, size, and soil quality), and
anonymous buyer and seller information. We select only arm’s-length transactions and re-
move observations with missing or inconsistent values. Additional outlier detection based
3Soil quality index is an official index for Germany to unify pedologic, scientific, and (agro-) economic
considerations including water availability within one measure for arable land (’Ackerzahl’) and grassland
(’Grünlandzahl’). Low (high) numbers indicate low (high) productivity (German Bundestag 2007). For
Saxony-Anhalt, values for arable land range between 20 and 104.
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Figure 1. Saxony-Anhalt farmland market 2017 at municipal level
on the minimum covariance determinant estimator (Rousseeuw and van Driessen 1999)
results in a data set of 10,778 observations.
To better understand price variation for the same fundamental value and to separate seller
and buyer-specific effects, we consider lot characteristics in the hedonic function, and vari-
ables explaining the environment in which the transaction occurs. Since many studies have
shown the price impact of subsidized renewable energy sources on land market prices (e.g.,
Haan and Simmler 2018; Towe and Tra 2013), we use information from the State Office for
Survey and Geoinformation (LVermGeo 2018c), the State Office of Statistics (StaLa 2018)
and the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA 2018), and add the density of wind power and
biomass capacity in a municipality, measured as the number of turbines and the electric
capacity per ha of agricultural land, respectively. We indicate if a lot is in a wind energy
area, which allows building a wind turbine, to capture high potential future earnings from
this alternative land use.
Likewise, we consider BVVG’s local share of the total number of transactions in the
respective municipality in the price analysis. To calculate BVVG’s local share, we consider
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all transactions in the year of a respective transaction and the preceding two years in a
given municipality. Such a contribution to transparency may decrease informational costs
in regions with many BVVG transactions for all participants.
As shown in table 1, the mean price over all transactions is about 1.63e=m2, but varies
between less than 0.30e=m2 and more than 4e=m2. The transacted lots have an average
size of about 3 ha, but the distribution ranges from less than 0.03 ha to more than 100 ha.
86 % of the lots can be operated independently (e.g., no further right of way is necessary),
and 1 % of the transactions lie in a region eligible for wind energy use. 66 % of the trans-
acted lots are leased out.
Also as shown in table 1, on the seller side, BVVG as the major player carries out about
8 % (910 observations) of all transactions in the data set. Public and professional sellers
each carry out about 2 % (256 and 181 observations). BVVG and professional sellers sell
on average larger lots, where professional sellers additionally sell at higher soil quality and
more often allow for independent operation. Public sellers sell at lower soil quality and lots
are less often leased out (for brevity, see Appendix, table 5). On the buyer side, farmers
buy 74 % (8,006 observations). Former tenants are the buyers in 49 % (5,264 observations)
and farmer as former tenants are the buyers in almost 50 % (5,236 observations). Lot
heterogeneity is less pronounced when differentiating on the buyer side with only minor
differences (cf. table 5).
Hypotheses
Germany’s post-communist economic transition changed the composition of land owner-
ship from state to a mix of private, restituted owners, and new and former owners that have
been buying land in the privatization process. Given this mix, figuring out price formation
remains challenging. Therefore, we develop the following three hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Seller information deficiency
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for data set, 2014–2017
N = 10,778 Mean Median SD Q1 Q99
Dependent variable
Price (e=m2) P 1:63 1:50 0:86 0:35 4:08
Lot Characteristics
Lot size (ha) xS 3:08 1:02 6:40 0:03 26:93
Soil quality (Index) xQ 64:11 66:00 22:65 21:00 100:00
Lot independence (1/0) xI 0:86 1 0:35 0 1
Lot is leased (1/0) xL 0:66 1 0:47 0 1
Wind energy area (1/0) xW 0:01 0 0:08 0 1
Controls at municipal level
Wind power turbines per ha mW 0:002 0:001 0:003 0 0:02
Biomass capacity kW per ha mB 0:33 0:1 2:44 0 2:58
Transaction share of BVVG mBVV G 0:12 0:09 0:10 0:00 0:48
Seller Characteristics
BVVG (1/0) sBVV G 0:08 0 0:28 0 1
Professional seller (1/0) sPro f 0:02 0 0:13 0 1
Public seller (1/0) sPub 0:02 0 0:15 0 1
Buyer Characteristics
Farmer (1/0) bF 0:74 1 0:44 0 1
Tenant (1/0) bT 0:49 0 0:50 0 1
Farmer and tenant (1/0) bFT 0:49 0 0:49 0 1
Farmer and non-tenant (1/0) bFNT 0:26 0 0:44 0 1
Note: Due to data privacy reasons, we cannot report minima and maxima.
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We hypothesize that information deficiencies for private sellers will be higher than for
professional sellers, but higher for professional sellers than for BVVG.
BVVG as the major player in Saxony Anhalt’s farmland market has around 20 % market
share by acreage on average, and up to 60 % in some regions (LVermGeo 2018a). BVVG
relies on tendering procedures, where auction rules, bidding requirements, and auction re-
sults are publicly available on the BVVG website and published in local media and farmers’
magazines. BVVG’s professionalism and level of specialization is hypothesized to ease the
search process and finding potential buyers with the highest WTP. Potential buyers may fur-
ther perceive lower risks concerning a transaction failure when considering BVVG. This
may even attract potential buyers and further ease search. Therefore, BVVG may benefit,
and fostered by the auction mechanism we hypothesize higher prices compared to other
sellers. That is, this group is expected to incur lower losses of information deficiency than
other sellers.
Although private owners continued to transact on their own, others began to use licensed
real estate agents. These professional sellers use, for example, procedures comparable to
public tenders, and advertise and target potential buyers efficiently. Due to this profession-
alism, we expect lower costs of information deficiency for these sellers compared to private
sellers without experience. However, compared to BVVG, real estate agents have a lower
turnover rate and thus we expect the markup to be lower for this group. As a third group,
public authorities such as municipalities or local governments may benefit from experience
but at a lower extent compared to real estate agents. This advantage may further be off-set
by costs caused by a potential principal agent problem: public sellers’ goal may not primar-
ily be selling at profit maximizing prices, and lower prices might be accepted due to time
limitations and missing incentives to invest in search (cf. Attkinson and Halvorsen 1986).
Hypothesis 2: Buyer information deficiency
We hypothesize that informational deficiencies for farmers and tenant buyers will be
lower than for non-farmers, but higher for non-tenant farmers than for tenant farmers.
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On the buyer side, we can distinguish by farmers and non-farmer buyers, and whether
the buyer was the former tenant. Thus, we cannot clearly rank by professionalism, we can
rather rely on asymmetric knowledge: farmers and tenants in particular are hypothesized
to be better informed about potential returns from land-use and the local land market con-
ditions. This informational advantage may in particular be relevant for expected alternative
supply offers at the time of the bidding. This may result in lower costs for information
acquisition for these groups and might offer to form more realistic expectations about the
returns reducing the likelihood of overpaying (e.g., winners’ curse). In our second hypoth-
esis, we expect a price decreasing effect of tenancy: as a result of the existing relation
between sellers and tenants prior to the transaction, social capital on both sides might in-
fluence the price by reducing search cost (e.g., Kostov 2010; Robinson, Myers, and Siles
2002). This social capital may result in a reduction of cost of being information deficient
for tenant farmers compared to non-tenant farmers and non-farmers.
Hypothesis 3: Information advantage based on lot size
We hypothesize that farmers and/or tenants have a price advantage over non-farmers
and/or non-tenants that is increasing in plot size.
Identification of a pure farmer effect may be challenging (cf. Croonenbroeck, Odening,
and Hüttel 2019), in particular since both groups, farmers and non-farmers, are rather het-
erogeneous. Both groups could contain investors and it may rather be the intention on how
to use the land after purchase that determines willingness to invest in search (e.g., Magnan
and Sunley 2017). This is why we consider that informational advantages of tenants and
potentially farmers with the intention to use that land could vary in plot size. For instance,
for larger plots, the group of non-farmer buyers may be less heterogeneous since these
lots do not reasonably allow alternative land use apart from farm operation such as horse
keeping, gardening or real estate (Brorsen, Doye, and Neal 2015). We further expect larger
transactions to be less heterogeneous in terms of lot constitution and valuation.4 Since val-
4We refer to Yiu, Wong, and Chau (2009) for evidence in real estate market
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Figure 2. Unconditional cumulative density functions of prices paid by seller type
(left) and buyer type (right)
uation is mainly based on the conventional and observable determinants of farmland prices,
this allows tenants and farmers to better use their knowledge about the expected returns.
Therefore, under hypothesis 3 we suspect larger plots to be sold with price markdowns to
farmers and/or tenants that increase with lot size.
Descriptive evidence: seller and buyer specific price differentials
We use the data set to systematically investigate the unconditional cumulative distribution
function of the raw prices by buyer and seller type. As shown in figure 2, there are differ-
ences in prices between professional, public and private sellers in the raw data. There are,
however, only small differences between the three potential combinations of (non-)farmers
and (non-)tenants types in the raw data, with the exception of slightly higher prices for
non-tenant farmers.
Model specification
To test the three hypotheses, we use log-linear regression equations consisting of a hedonic
part h(x) and the combined error term e that collects noise and the information deficiency
costs for buyers and sellers. Based on a Box-Cox transformation for the continuous vari-
ables, lot size and soil quality, we enter them into the model in power transformations
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and in interaction, and enter other regional continuous variables such as renewable energy
sources linearly. To capture the implicit spatio-temporal effects, we use twelve location
indicators LCk based on regional classes provided by the Committee of Land Valuation
Experts (LVermGeo 2018b).5 We model the time effects by using linear-quadratic trend,
t and t2, as well as a locally differing trends by interacting the trend variables with the
location indicators. The regression equation can be formulated as
(8)
log(P) = bS
p
xS+bQ
p
xQ+bSQ(xS  xQ)+bIxI +bLxL+bW xW
+ gW mW + gBmB+ gBVV GmBVV G+ gtt+ gt2t
2
+
12
å
k=1
gLC;kLCk +
12
å
k=1
gLC;t;k(LCk  t)+ e;
where the b ’s denote the respective hedonic parameters to be estimated and g’s denote the
parameters for regional variables at the municipal level and the time- and spatial effects.
We consider two models, T T 1 and T T 2 using the two-tier approach with differing error
term specifications e by model (cf. table 2). Both models obey an identical specification of
the seller side: dummy variables for BVVG, other professional, and public sellers (hypoth-
esis 1). On the buyer side, in T T 1 we assess whether information asymmetries for tenant
and non-tenant farmers compared to non-farmers exist and if they are price influencing
(hypothesis 2). We also assess whether the informational advantages are more pronounced
depending on the size of the transaction (hypothesis 3).
To test these hypotheses, indicators of tenant and non-tenant farmers enter the error term
interacted with lot size.6 To test hypothesis 3 we enhance model T T 1 by adding interaction
terms of lot size and its square with buyer characteristics. This gives model T T 2 that allows
us to test whether buyer-specific price effects are sensitive to lot size. As shown in table
2, d denote the parameters to be estimated and capture the impact of buyer and seller
5Each location class represents a geographically compact area with similar characteristics, such as connection
to infrastructure. Refer to figure 7 in the Appendix for a map.
6A simpler model specification failed to converge probably caused by the high overlap of the two buyer
indicators and missing variation over transactions.
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Table 2. Specifications of the error term e
Model e = u(zu;i;du)+w(zw;i;dw)+ v
LIN a+dsBVV GsBVV G+dsPubsPub+dsPro f sPro f
+dbFT;xS(bFT  xS)+dbFNT;xS(bFNT  xS)+ v
T T 1 -exp[mS+dsBVV GsBVV G+dsPubsPub+dsPro f sPro f ]
+exp[mB+dbFT;xS(bFT  xS)+dbFNT;xS(bFNT  xS)]+ v
T T 2 -exp[mS+dsBVV GsBVV G+dsPubsPub+dsPro f sPro f ]
+exp[mB+dbFT;xS(bFT  xS)+dbFNT;xS(bFNT  xS)
+dbFT;x2S(bFT  x
2
S)+dbFNT;x2S(bFNT  x
2
S)]+ v
characteristics, where mB and mS denote the baseline cost of information deficiency for
buyers and sellers (mw and mu ). We estimate them as intercepts of the exponential functions
to ensure that the sign of the effect of the costs of being information deficient on the price
is consistent with theory. The baseline cost of information deficiency is required to scale
the impact of the respective buyer and seller characteristics, but will not be interpreted
directly. Finally, we compare the findings of the two-tier model and a linear benchmark
model LIN, where the seller and buyer characteristics linearly add to the hedonic part.
Model LIN includes an intercept a , which is omitted in the two-tier model, to identify
baseline inefficiency terms mB and mS, respectively. Both models share an additional noise
term v.
We estimate models T T 1 and T T 2 using the NLS procedure and estimate the linear
benchmark model LIN using OLS. To account for heteroscedasticity induced by the com-
posed error term, we refer to multiway clustered standard errors with clusters corresponding
to combinations of thirty quantiles of lot size and the squared soil quality.7
7All calculations are performed with R (R Core Team 2019). NLS estimation uses the nls function from the
stats package. Estimation of robust standard errors uses the sandwich package (Zeileis 2004). To ensure
convergence, we run estimations for the non-linear models 5000 times with random starting values. R codes
are available upon request.
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Results
Table 3 lists the models’ parameter estimates for the hedonic variables and the buyer and
seller characteristics; see table 6 in the appendix for the estimates of spatial controls and
time trends. Overall, the models show satisfactory goodness of fit as indicated by the
squared correlation coefficient of about 0.67 across all models. The hedonic estimates are
strikingly similar across the different specifications. As noted by Kumbhakar and Parmeter
(2010), the intercept of LIN corresponds to the sum of the baseline cost of being informa-
tion deficient if E[w  u] = 0, otherwise OLS-estimates would be biased. A comparison
with the sum of the baseline terms in T T 1 ( 2:142 e0:925+ e 0:990) does not indicate
such bias. In this case, the estimates of the benchmark model LIN represent average effects
for sellers and buyers.
In line with previous studies, we find positive coefficients of soil quality and lot size
(e.g., Lehn and Bahrs 2018), although non-linear (e.g., Maddison 2000; Sheng, Jackson,
and Lawson 2018). Including the negative interaction coefficients, the price effect of ad-
ditional size decreases in size, whereas the price effect for higher quality soils may be too
costly, that is, the effect of additional size can even reverse (cf. figure 3 for T T 1). In the
latter case, capital or borrowing constraints may also increase (Brorsen, Doye, and Neal
2015). Interestingly, we note that whether a lot can be independently used and leased out is
irrelevant for the price vector. Other studies, however, have indicated a potential relation-
ship between the price effect of lot size and an independent use (e.g., Gluszak and Zygmunt
2018).
A recent study by Haan and Simmler (2018) using aggregated data found significant
land-owner effects in other regions of Germany, whereas we find that regional renewable
energy production does not influence the price of individual farmlands. Other studies using
transaction data, however, found significant effects of biomass based energy production on
rental prices in boom years (e.g., Hennig and Latacz-Lohmann 2016).
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Figure 3. Marginal effect of lot size on the price for different
soil qualities based on T T 1
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Figure 4. Parameter estimates and 95 % confidence intervals for buyer and seller
variables
Results underline relevance of BVVG’s regional activities: a 1 % increase in the share of
transactions corresponds to a 0.15 % price increase, a finding which is contrary to Hüttel,
Wildermann, and Croonenbroeck (2016). In regions and times when BVVG has a higher
share, overall market transparency may be higher. This is because BVVG’s tendering pro-
cedures offer more information on the market volume and their policy to publish transaction
data may ease forming a bid. As a result, prices could be closer to the competitive price.
BVVG’s dominance over space and time, however, may also be evidence of market power.
Figure 4 summarizes the estimates of seller and buyer variables for models T T 1 and
T T 2. Respective positive d coefficients indicate increasing information deficiency with
the respective variable, and negative signs indicate the opposite. Regarding price effects, a
positive d parameter for one buyer type indicates a higher price for this group compared to
the reference (non-farmer, non-tenant). A positive parameter on the seller side, however,
indicates lower prices for the respective seller group compared to the reference group (non-
professional sellers).
Models T T 1 and T T 2, which both show statistically significant negative parameter es-
timates for the three seller types, reveal that professional seller groups obtain higher prices
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Table 4. Marginal effects of seller and buyer types evaluated at the sample
mean
T T 1 T T 2
e=m2 % p  value e=m2 % p  value
Seller
BVVG 0:70 47:41 0:000 0:68 46:82 0:000
Professional 0:30 20:44 0:000 0:29 19:57 0:000
Public 0:11 7:22 0:000 0:10 6:97 0:000
Buyer
Farmer 0:00  0:10 0:942 0:06 4:04 0:000
Tenancy  0:04  2:81 0:000  0:08  4:82 0:000
Tenant farmer  0:04  2:90 0:099  0:02  0:98 0:214
Note: Asterisks correspond to: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01.
P-values based on standard errors retrieved using the delta method.
(hypothesis 1). This finding may be related to the benefits, that is, lower cost of being infor-
mation deficient. The two models and the simplified model indicate the strongest effect for
BVVG, followed by professional sellers and public sellers. The order of these effects sug-
gests that information deficiency decreases with professionalism and level of specialization,
for instance, professional sellers invest more in targeting potential buyers and in advertising
which reduces search cost. To quantify these markups, table 4 lists the marginal effects of
the seller types evaluated at the sample mean. BVVG’s markup of 0.70e=m2, corresponds
to 47 % higher prices, whereas professional sellers’ obtain 20 % higher prices compared to
private sellers, and public vendors obtain 0.11e=m2 higher prices. While BVVG’s price
effect may reflect a high level of professionalism, the markup may also relate to the use
of first-price auctions with public tenders. Auctions deliver higher revenues than negoti-
ated sales (e.g., Bulow and Klemperer 1996), where empirical evidence for the real estate
context exists (e.g., Chow, Hafalir, and Yavas 2015).
To illustrate the non-linear relation of the seller-specific price-effects, figure 5 shows
the price differences of BVVG (left panel), professional sellers (middle) and public sellers
(right panel) compared to private sellers depending on lot size and soil quality, using model
T T 1 and holding other variables fixed at their respective sample means. We note that the
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Figure 5. Differences in predicted prices for BVVG (left), professional
sellers (middle) and public sellers (right) compared to private sellers
based on T T 1
gap between prices for private sellers and all seller types is small for lots with low quality,
and higher for medium sized lots with very high quality. Competition for high quality
soil lots may be higher for medium sized lots, given the valuation of soil quality. Search
cost may be more relevant for larger sizes also for professional sellers, where the financial
constraints of buyers may come into play. BVVG’s price markups show strongest increases
with lot size and quality among all sellers. Again, BVVG’s professionalism may be a
factor, but strategic supply management may be another. We note that few observations
in our sample are both, large and of high quality and hence predictions may suffer from
extrapolation bias.
Regarding the buyer side, both models T T 1 and T T 2 indicate price effects for farmer
buyers being tenants (cf. lower part of figure 4). The magnitude of the parameter estimates
varies across the models, but the marginal effect of tenancy, calculated as the difference of
predicted prices between a tenant and a non-tenant farmer, differs only slightly: in T T 1
the tenancy effect is -0.04e=m2 and in T T 2, it is around -0.08e=m2. The tenant farmer
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effect compares the predicted prices for a farmer buyer being a tenant to a non-agricultural
buyer: using mean lot characteristics (3.08 ha, 64.11 soil quality points), the tenant farmer
effect corresponds to 2.90 % (0.98 %) lower prices, respectively, if the tenant buys. The
negative price impact may indicate a lower cost of informational deficiency for this group
compared to non-farmers, because farmers being tenants may have better knowledge of
substitutes (hypothesis 2). The models, however, show non-robust effects for farmers not
being tenants. Contrary to T T 1, T T 2 shows that non-tenant farmers pay 0.06 e=m2 more
than non-farmers for an average plot, or about 4 % higher prices (cf. table 4).
We infer that the heterogeneity of the farmer and non-farmer groups may account for the
rather small positive effect at the mean. For the non-tenant farmer group, we speculate that
the identified effect may even be diluted since we would expect different effects whether
a non-tenant is local or not. This information, however, was unavailable in the data set,
but we did suspect that the group of buyers may be more heterogeneous for smaller lots,
because of a larger usage portfolio, such as gardening, horse-keeping, or speculation on
infrastructure or housing, particularly in urban proximity. Significant interaction terms of
buyer identity with lot size indicate the relevance of size in support of our hypothesis. The
terms suggest that information deficiency-effects on the buyer side are non-linear in lot
size. To illustrate these effects, figure 6 shows, for T T 1 (left panel) and T T 2 (right), the
predicted prices for different buyer types as a function of the lot size with other variables
fixed at the sample mean.
For both models, the plots show a price difference between tenant farmers and other
buyer types that increases in transaction volume, but in model T T 2, which includes a
linear-quadratic size term (cf. right panel of figure 6) the tenant effect decreases after ap-
proximately 20 ha, and the plots larger than 40 ha show no price effect (hypothesis 3). We
attribute the fact that tenant farmers appear to pay less for medium-sized lots to lower search
and information costs, because tenants are probably familiar with local market conditions,
particularly alternatives, which may be relevant for medium-sized lots. While there is no
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Figure 6. Predicted prices by buyer type for model T T 1 (left) and T T 2 (right)
price difference between farmers due to tenancy for very large plots, farmers still achieve a
markdown compared to non-farmers; a result that could not be obtained from the simpler
size-relation in T T 1. Likely, farmers are able to use their informational advantage regard-
ing the sector and potentially benefit from experiences compared to non-farmers for larger
lots, where local tenants act as other farmers do, as investors. However, the effects for very
large plots may suffer from out-of-sample predictions and should be interpreted with care.
Concluding remarks
Within this article we investigate the role of asymmetric information and search cost in
the price formation in thin farmland markets. We analyze how the asymmetries related to
buyer and seller characteristics can explain price dispersion for the same fundamental value.
We build a two-tier stochastic frontier model with a scaling property free of distributional
assumptions regarding the error terms, basing it on a hedonic model under incomplete
information and relating the search costs to the degree of professionalism on the seller side
and the informational advantages of (non-)farmers and (non-)tenants on the buyer side.
We formulate three hypotheses and empirically assess them using a data set of more than
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10,000 transactions between 2014 and 2017 in the agricultural state of Saxony-Anhalt in
Germany.
The results affirm the important role played by information asymmetries and the search
process in the thin farmland market. While controlling for conventional hedonic character-
istics, such as lot size and soil quality, determines land prices, we find that buyer and seller
characteristics explain price dispersion for the same fundamental value. For the seller side,
our results support our hypothesis that professionalism and experience decrease informa-
tion and search costs. We find that information deficiency decreases with professionalism
and level of specialization, and that BVVG, the largest seller, obtains the lowest losses, fol-
lowed by professional private sellers, public, and private sellers. We conclude that targeted
strategies, marketing campaigns, and skillful use of the media give professional sellers a
significant informational advantage and reduce the cost of searching for buyers with the
highest willingness to pay.
On the buyer side, we find that farmers and tenant farmers use sector knowledge and
information about local market conditions to obtain lower price and search costs. Former
tenant farmers appear to have a significant informational advantage, particularly for substi-
tutes in the near term. We also propose two explanations for our finding of a relationship
between tenants’ alleged informational advantages and medium-sized lots. First, smaller
lots may comprise additional heterogeneity, for instance, potential rezoning or alternative
land use. Second, the group of non-tenants may compromise farmer and non-farmer in-
vestors and thus larger lots may comprise a less heterogeneous group of buyers.
From an academic perspective, our results imply that explicitly modeling informational
asymmetries will allow the cost of incomplete information to be identified. If information
asymmetries are correlated with hedonic characteristics, not acknowledging implications
of these asymmetries in the modeling approach is likely to lead to inefficient estimation
and biased coefficients for the hedonic function. From a policy perspective, our results
imply that increasing market transparency will lead to more efficient markets. In particular,
28
our results emphasize the weak position of private sellers who have difficulties searching
for information about farmland transactions because of cost, outdated or missing data, etc.
While BVVG currently remains the major source of market data, we suggest that it will
no longer be the case after re-privatization is completed in 2030. To support a more level
playing field on the supply side, policies aiming at market efficiency should ease access to
information.
Based on the research in this article, we suggest several directions for future research.
First, a simple binary coding of farmers/non-farmers and tenants/non-tenants may not cover
all relevant dimensions of the information asymmetries, therefore resulting in a heteroge-
neous counterfactual. Further, such differentiation may hinder identification because of a
strong overlap among the groups. To overcome these issues, we suggest a more detailed
recording of buyer characteristics with potential intentions to use the land. Second, the role
of market power as it affects both supply and demand merits investigation when a large
player dominates local and regional markets or maintains an informational advantage. The
interplay between land sales and rental markets should be explored in more detail. We also
suggest that a deeper understanding of the roles played by speculation effects and bargain-
ing power in thin markets will be beneficial for policy-makers.
29
Appendix
Figure 7. Map of location classes
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics by seller and buyer types
Mean Median St. Dev. Q1 Q99
Seller: BVVG
Price (e=m2) 2:43 2:42 1:00 0:60 4:77
Lot Size (ha) 8:17 3:38 14:73 0:03 90:66
Soil Quality (Index) 63:91 65:00 21:99 21:00 99:00
Lot Independence (1/0) 0:86 1:00 0:35 0:00 1:00
Wind energy area (1/0) 0:00 0:00 0:07 0:00 0:00
Lot is leased (1/0) 0:67 1:00 0:47 0:00 1:00
Seller: Professional Seller
Price (e=m2) 2:37 2:42 1:06 0:57 4:61
Lot Size (ha) 5:65 4:58 7:61 0:06 23:00
Soil Quality (Index) 70:71 75:00 22:29 22:00 99:00
Lot Independence (1/0) 0:94 1:00 0:23 0:00 1:00
Wind energy area (1/0) 0:01 0:00 0:07 0:00 0:00
Lot is leased (1/0) 0:69 1:00 0:46 0:00 1:00
Seller: Public Seller
Price (e=m2) 1:58 1:40 0:89 0:41 4:13
Lot Size (ha) 4:39 0:82 10:94 0:02 68:37
Soil Quality (Index) 59:18 58:50 23:13 20:10 100:00
Lot Independence (1/0) 0:72 1:00 0:45 0:00 1:00
Wind energy area (1/0) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Lot is leased (1/0) 0:48 0:00 0:50 0:00 1:00
Buyer: Farmer
Price (e=m2) 1:65 1:52 0:86 0:35 4:18
Lot Size (ha) 3:36 1:18 6:68 0:06 29:06
Soil Quality (Index) 64:93 67:00 22:42 21:00 100:00
Lot Independence (1/0) 0:89 1:00 0:31 0:00 1:00
Wind energy area (1/0) 0:01 0:00 0:09 0:00 0:00
Lot is leased (1/0) 0:78 1:00 0:41 0:00 1:00
Buyer: Tenant
Price (e=m2) 1:59 1:50 0:81 0:35 3:96
Lot Size (ha) 3:02 1:00 6:43 0:06 28:21
Soil Quality (Index) 65:50 68:00 22:32 21:00 100:00
Lot Independence (1/0) 0:89 1:00 0:31 0:00 1:00
Wind energy area (1/0) 0:01 0:00 0:09 0:00 0:00
Lot is leased (1/0) 0:88 1:00 0:33 0:00 1:00
Note: Due to data privacy reasons, we cannot report minima and maxima.
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Table 6. Regional and time control variable estimates
N = 10,778 LIN T T 1 T T 2
Location classes
Altmark-Mitte 0:347 (0:077) 0:345 (0:077) 0:346 (0:077)
Altmark-Ost 0:098 (0:092) 0:098 (0:092) 0:095 (0:092)
Altmark-West 0:273 (0:070) 0:273 (0:071) 0:278 (0:071)
Boerde 0:673 (0:045) 0:672 (0:046) 0:673 (0:046)
HAL-Sued 0:474 (0:045) 0:474 (0:045) 0:470 (0:045)
Harz 0:078 (0:039) 0:077 (0:039) 0:077 (0:039)
MD-HAL 0:515 (0:033) 0:516 (0:034) 0:516 (0:034)
MD-Nord 0:180 (0:039) 0:179 (0:039) 0:183 (0:038)
MD-Ost 0:462 (0:049) 0:460 (0:049) 0:460 (0:049)
ST-Sued 0:563 (0:045) 0:561 (0:045) 0:555 (0:046)
Vorharz 0:428 (0:046) 0:427 (0:046) 0:427 (0:045)
Time trend
Trend 0:161 (0:020) 0:160 (0:020) 0:161 (0:020)
Trend2  0:012 (0:003)  0:012 (0:003)  0:012 (0:003)
Interactions
Altmark-Mitte  trend 0:009 (0:023) 0:008 (0:023) 0:009 (0:023)
Altmark-Ost  trend 0:038 (0:030) 0:037 (0:030) 0:04 (0:030)
Altmark-West  trend 0:013 (0:025) 0:012 (0:026) 0:012 (0:025)
Boerde  trend  0:021 (0:009)  0:021 (0:009)  0:021 (0:009)
HAL-Sued  trend  0:024 (0:013)  0:024 (0:013)  0:022 (0:012)
Harz  trend 0:011 (0:011) 0:011 (0:012) 0:012 (0:011)
MD-HAL  trend  0:022 (0:007)  0:022 (0:007)  0:022 (0:007)
MD-Nord  trend 0:008 (0:014) 0:008 (0:014) 0:007 (0:013)
MD-Ost  trend  0:022 (0:013)  0:022 (0:013)  0:021 (0:013)
ST-Sued  trend  0:016 (0:012)  0:016 (0:012)  0:013 (0:012)
Vorharz  trend  0:006 (0:012)  0:006 (0:012)  0:005 (0:012)
Location classes yes yes yes
Observations 10,778 10,778 10,778
CorP, Pˆ 0.676 0.676 0.677
Residual Std. Error 0.326 (df = 10,739) 0.326 (df = 10,738) 0.325 (df = 10,736)
Note: Clustered standard errors (at thirty quantiles of lot size and the squared soil quality) in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate the following:  = p<0.1;  = p<0.05;  = p<0.01.
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